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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ALICE Loos, 
Plaintiff and Respondent J 
vs. 
Mo"LXTAI~ FuEL SuPPLY CoM-
PANY, a corporation, and UTAH 
MoTOR PARK, INcORPORATED, a 
corporation, 
Defendavn~ts and Appellants. 
Oase No. 6211 
Reply Brief of Appellant 
Utah Motor Park, Incorporated 
There are two things which ·prompt this appellant to 
file a reply: First, that in some particulars respondent 
ihas forgotten the facts and issues; and second, that coun-
sel for re·spondent seems to have imagined certain facts 
to have ·been established by the evidence in applying the 
law. 
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FACTS AND IBSUES. 
On page two of respondent'·s brief is the following 
statement: 
"It is admitted by the respondent that the 
appellant F'uel Supply Company, hereinafter re-
ferred to as Gas Company, supplied natural gas 
to the M-otor Park and the M1otor Park to its fur-
nished cottages, including that occupied by re-
spondent at the time of the accident.'' 
Counsel for respondent certainly 1had a lapse of 
memory when he made that statement out of thin air. 
Nowhere in either the allegat1ons or the evidence is there 
an allegation or admission that the Motor Park furnished 
gas to its cottages. 
Paragraph two of the amended )complaint expressly 
alleges that the defendant Gas Company was supplying 
the gas to the defendant Motor Park and to the individual 
cottages by means of pipe laid underground from its 
source ·Of supply and by means of connections leading 
from its system of pipes to the heating and ·cooking faci-
lities in the apartments maintained by the Motor Park 
for use of the tenants of the Motor Park. 
Paragraph three alleges that the Motor Park oper-
ates its apartments which were supplied with gas from 
the system of pipes fDom the defendant Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company. (Ab. 3-4) 
These allegations were admitted by the defendant 
Motor Park (Ab. 14-15). The only evidence on the sub-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
jert was g-iven by the \Yitness Lindholm, who testified 
(~-\..h. 66) to the effect that the Utah Motor Park had 
nothing to do with the regulatiron of the ,supply of gas 
to the Park. ....\side from these allegations, admissions, 
and that one statement by ~lr. Lindholm, the subjeet 
matter \Yas never Inentioned. 
On page 11 is the following: ''That the pipes and 
connections ·were not inspected by either defendant, but 
{)n the contrary the duty of reporting leaks was left to 
tenants, is established and is not in dispute.'' 
\\There counsel could have found a basis for that 
statement is certainly a. mystery. 
~-\..nd on page 14, speaking .of the Gas Company, coun-
sel says: ''But it also knew that the .Motor Park made n.o 
inspection rbut merely reported it when the ,odor of gas 
became so offensive to tenants that they n1a.de complaint 
of it." 
And again on page 23 is the following, speaking of 
the Motor Park: ''Its manager testified in the case that 
when complaint was made of the rodor of gas it made no 
investigation but ealled the Gas Company and left to it 
the duty of locating the leak and repairing it." 
Undoubtedly we could safely rely upon this court to 
read the record and decide tihe case upon the f~acts es-
tablished' by the evidence, but in the face of such glaring 
misstatements we feel constrained to aga1n call the 
~court's attention to the evidence upon these subjects, 
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,since they are all more or less related and refer to the 
same proposition. 
Mr. Lindholm testified (Ab. 48-49) in answer toques-
tions by counsel for pla.intiff, that when an odor of gas 
was reported the :Motor Park would in most instances 
make an investigation by going over to see if they could 
take care of it themselves, but if someone said tihere was 
a ba:d odor of gas they would call the Gas Company im-
mediately. Again under cross-examination of cownsel for 
plaintiff (A b. 69-70-71) Mr. L~ndholm was asked the ques-
tion if there was anybody whose duty it was to investi-
gate and find out what was wrong when gas was leaking, 
and he answered that he always sent Mr. Sheets, assist-
ant manager, or investigated it himself, and that in fa.ct 
all tihe employees had instructions if there were any leaks 
to make a report to the office, and we would check and 
find out, and if there were gas leaks the Motor Park re-
ported to the Gas Company, ''always called the Gas Com-
pany'', and after the repairs were made the Motor Park 
always checked up to find out if it was repaired. The gas 
man didn't leave until it was repaired. He would require 
the Motor Park to sign a small slip showing that the re-
pair had been made, and that tihe Motor Park, by Mr. 
Lindholm personally or by employees, always n1ade an 
inve,stigatiton to find out if the repairs were satisfactory, 
and also ''in going through cottages he observed the odor 
of gas at times when it had not ibeen reported". Reports 
of odor of gas were made mtore frequently than odors 
were found by investigation. 
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Tenants were ,shown the ~cottages by an employee of 
the Motor Park before they were rented, as was done with 
Mr. and ~Irs. Loos. If tihere was anything wrong with 
the ·cottage, or if there was a gas odor in the cottage, it 
would be observed at the time. At that time the heating 
apparatus was tested and the tenant was shown how to 
operate it. 
)lr. Sheets testified (Ab. 57) that when the odor of 
gas was reported the Park employees would go and see 
if there were a gas leak, and if uhere were they would 
notify the gas company, and (Ab. 58) that they were al-
ways on the lookout for anything as they worked around 
the court. 
The Motor Park employed a. housekeeper and maids 
(Ab. 61-63). It was the duty iOf the maids to ·see that the 
cottages were kept elean, and it was the duty of the 
!housekeeper to see that everything was run correctly, 
to see that the ma~ds did their work, and to take care 
of a.ny ·complaints. So far as week to week tenants or 
monthly tenants were concerned, it was the maid's duty 
when pe1ople moved out to dean the cabins, make the beds, 
clean the floors and bathroom and the wash basin, and 
so far as Mr. and Mrs. Loos were concerned to go once 
a week to the Loos 1cottage to give them clean linen, and 
the head !housekeeper was in the Loos cottage about two 
o'clock on the afternoon .of the accident. 
In addition the Motor Park utilized the services of 
the Gas Company to the very utmost in investigating and 
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che.eking for leaks and in seeing that they were repaired. 
The·Gas Company hired experts in the matter of handling 
gas and dete·eting and repairing leaks. It was their busi-
nes·s. As befiore stated, the Motor Park was a customer 
or consumer. It did. not pretend to be an expert in the 
handling of gas any more than Mr. and Mrs. Loos or any 
other customer in Salt Lake City or elsewhere. It was 
only natural that it should go to the Gas Company for 
this clas-s ·Of .service, and it had a right to assume that 
when the Has Company reported that the repairs were 
made that such was the fact, and it boo the right to as-
sume that if there was anything wrong with the situation 
down there that the Gas Company would know it and see 
that it was corrected. 
Oounsel for plaintiff makes much of the fact that 
both Mr. Lindholm and Mr. Sheets testified that they re-
lied upon tenants to make complaints of gas odors if 
there were any. 
This was not, as stated by counsel for plaintiff, the 
exclusive ·Source of information. It was, however, only 
natural that the tenants or occupants ·should ibe the main 
source of information. They were occupying the pr·em-
i·ses to the exclusion of the Motor Park. This was parti-
cularly true of month to month tenants and week to week 
tenants. Employees of the Motor Park had no more 
right to g10 into the cottages than an apartment house 
owner would have to go into the apartments of his ten-
ants. The tenant wa·s operating the appliances and oc-
cupying the premises to the exclusion of the Motor Park 
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employees. This was the m1ost natural source for the 
Motor Park officials to look to for ,complaints. 
Counsel for plaintiff states ·On page 11 "that there 
was not sufficient ventilation t~o prevent accumulation 
of gas in dangerous quantities may also be inferred from 
what happened there". Certainly it is evident that the 
gas which came into the cottage by a ·sudden gush at the 
time of the explosion could not eseape. This is no evi-
dence of the fact that the eottages were not properly and 
sufficiently ventilated for ordinary purposes. The Motor 
Park ·was bound to use only ordimary care and to pro-
vide for ordinary events. There was no duty up1on the 
Motor Park to provide ventilation to take care of ex-
traordinary events. Otherwise it would be impossible 
to either construct 10T maintain a house, residence, fwc~ 
tory or other structure. All gas pipes are laid in the 
ground or within partition walls, in basements, or in 
conduits. If the owners of premises were required to 
provide sufficient ventilation at each spot in their prem-
ises to take care of a sudden gush of gas which might oc-
cur by reason of some unforeseen and unforseea:ble in-
cident there could be no such thing as modern building. 
If the vents which were provided were insufficient to take 
care of ordinary events and to take care of any natural 
or probable leaks and to provide for the es~cape of fumes 
which in the ordinary and usual operation of premises 
might ,occur, then it seems to us that it would have been 
possible for plaintiff to provide that evidence through 
the ·calling of any builder or heating engineer. 
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'Throughout respondent's brief it is assumed that 
there is evidence in the case to the effe-ct that this ex-
plosion occurred in a portion of the premise.s under the 
e~clusive control of defendant M.otor Park. It is also 
a·ssumed throughout the brief that ther~e is evidence in 
the case to the effect that the pipes and connections with-
in ,or beneath the Loos cottage were leaking prior to the 
time of the a1ccident and that the explosion occurred iby 
reason of a leak beneath the Loos cottage. T1here is no 
such evidence and such assumptions are in error. We 
shall discuss this in connection with the particular points 
inv,olved. 
POINT I. 
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE CASE 
TO THE JURY AS AGAINST DIDFENDANT MOTOR PARK? 
It will be observed: 
1. That plaintiff does not pretend to have presented 
any evidence of the structural defect alleged in para-
gra·pihs 4, 5, and 6 of the amended ·complaint. 
2 .. That plaintiff failed to establish by any evidence 
the allegation that def.endant Motor Park failed to make 
inspection of its premises, but on the contrary the un-
contradicted evi·dence shows that it was vigilant and 
made frequent and 'continuous inspections, and this not-
withstanding the fact that this court in the case of Hatsis 
v. Uwited States Fuel Company, 82 Utah 38, held that 
there is no liability upon a lHndlord for failure to inspect 
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and discover hidden da.ng·er.s, and that there is no duty 
on the landlord to discover and apprise the tenant of 
bidden or unk.n·own defects, if any. 
3. Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to the 
effect that the ventilat1on provided beneath the cottage 
was insufficient. 
Counsel for respondent seems to feel, however, that 
this lack of evidence is cured and the deficient evidence 
supplied bee.a.use defendants objected to the cross-ex-
amination of Mr. Lindholm as to the cause of t1he accident 
and because the court refused to compel Mr. Slusser of 
the P.ublic Service Commission to testify, and because 
counsel assumes that defendants had information in their 
pos·session as to the cause of the explosion, which they 
failed to produce. 
As to the witness Lindholm, respondent called him 
as a witness as part of respondent's case, and examined 
him at length upon the issues ·Of the case (Ab. 43--50). 
Mr. Lindholm was not asked one question at that time 
as to the cause of the explosion, the ~construction of the 
cottage, or what, if any, structural defects there were 
within the cottages as alleged in the complaint. Counsel 
for respondent had ample opportunity at that time to ask 
Mr. Lindholm any question which he desired to do. He 
failed to do so and failed to ask any other witness any 
question upon that ·subject matter. Subsequently, when 
Mr. Lindholm was called as a witness for defendants (Ab. 
64-69) he wa.s interrogated upon other subjects upon 
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direct examination. Counsel for respondent then s~ought 
iby cross-examination to ask Mr. Lindholm the question 
(Ab. 73), "You haven't any information now as to how 
this accident happened~", t,o, wihich objeetion was made 
upon the ground that it was improper cross-examination 
and which objection was sustained. No appeal is taken 
from that ruling of the eourt but ·counsel would now at-
tempt to take advantage ,of tna t to raise a presumption 
that the defendant Motor Park was concealing some-
thing. Not only was it improper cross-examination but 
the question called for hearsay and speculation upon the 
part of Mr. Lindholm. It was uncontradicted that Mr. 
Lindholm was not here when the accident occurred and 
had not been for .some time before, and did not return 
to Salt Lake City for weeks after the accident. 
-counsel for respondent ·s·erved a demand (Ab. 50-51) 
that they be allowed to inspect the premises and certain 
pipes, unions and 'connections. While the dem·and to see 
the apartment was somewhat peculiar in view of the fact 
that it was destroyed, nevertheless counsel for respond-
ent himself states (Ab. 51) that he was told that the pipes 
were there and that he was welcome to ·see them. The 
pipes were brought into, court but no one was called to 
identify them, and no effort was made at all to present 
them in evidence or to elicit any information with refer-
ence to them. 
Respondent -called Mr. Slusser of the Public Servi·ce 
Commission to testify. He appeared by counsel (Ab. 52) 
and claimed the privilege and refused to testify under 
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the pro,·isions of Seetion 104-49L3 (;)) and Section 76-
4-16. In addition both defendants objected to the emn-
p.eteney of the evidence. ·The -court refused to con1pel 
the \Yitness to testify. 
The last pr,oYision of the statute requires the Public 
SerTice Commission to investigate the cause of al1 a.c-
eidents occurring \\·ithin the .~tate resulting in loss of 
life or injury to persons or property connected with any 
pwblic utility, or directly or indirectly arising fftom the 
maintenanee or operation of utilities. It provides fur-
ther that neither the order nor recommendation of the 
Commission, nor any accident report filed with the Com-
mission shall be admitted as evidence in any action for 
damages based upon or arising out of the loss of life or 
injury to person ,or property referred to in the se,ction. 
The other section of the statute provides that a public 
officer .cannot be examined as to eommunica tions n1ade 
to him in official confidence when the public interests 
would suffer by the disc1osure. 
Respondent failed to assign cross-errors in connec-
tion with this ruling of the court, and we respectfully 
submit that under the authorities no presumption arises 
either way from failure to produce ·such evidence. 
The law required defendant Motor Park to give the 
Public Service Commissioner a free hand in investigat-
ing this accident and required defendant to place at the 
disposal of the Public Service ·Commissioner all evidenc•e 
in its posses·sion, including the pipes, connections, and 
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appliances within the cottages. Certainly defendant is 
not to be prejudiced by t:his requirement of the law. 
Plaintiff's husband was in Salt Lake City at the time .of 
the accident and rue-cording to his own evidence remained 
here for about five weeks. He had free access to the 
premises where the accident occurred to make any in-
vestigation which he desired, either per.sonally or by rep-
res·entative. He testified (Ab. 28) tha.t he made an ex-
amination of the premises. He certainly had all o.f the 
opportunity which defendant·s had to make· any examina-
tion and investigation that he desired, and for such pur-
pose he could have utilized an engineer had he so desired. 
In fact he had greater opportunity than the defendant 
Motor Park be-cause the manager o.f tihe Motor Park was 
absent and did not return f:or weeks. 
There may be some doulbt as to whether the privi-
lege of the statute would have extended so as to preclude 
the witness Slusser or some other witnes·s from the Public 
Servi·ce Commission from identifying the pipes whi,ch 
they took into their possession. For some reason best 
known to counsel for respondent he preferred to stand 
upon a supposed unfavorable presumption against de-
fendants by reason of tihis ·situation than to make any 
effort to have the pipes identified or to present competent 
evidence upon the subject matter. 
This cas·e therefore does not fall within the authori-
ties cited by counsel to the effect that if a party to the 
·suit fails to present evidence in its possession not avail-
able to the other party, an unfaV:orable presumption 
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anses therefrom. 'The evidence was equally available 
and equally unavailable to all parties, and Mr. Slusser 
equally disqualified as a witness to testify for or against 
either party as to matters and things which he discovered 
in his investigation, and the evidence was equally privi-
leged as against all parties as to Mr. Slusser's conclu-
sions or opinions. 
Respondent cites 36 1Corpus Juris, Section 887, page 
212, to the effect that where a landlord leases separate 
portions of the same property to different tenants but 
reserves under his -control certain parts to· be used in 
common by all tenants, that the landlord is under the 
implied obligation to keep the part over which he reserves 
control in repair; and that tJhis doctrine likewi·se applies 
to that portion to which the tenants have no right of a~c­
cess; and also to agencies, appliances and instrumental-
ities supplied by the landlord for the use of the several 
tenants. Counsel also quotes a.t length a ·statement by 
s·ome editor of A. L. R., found in 13 A. L. R. at page 837, 
to the effect that a landlord is also responsible for the 
maintenance of a plant or system installed for the bene-
fit of all tenants regardle·ss of where it is located. 
Tihe doctrine contended for by respondent is im-
pliedly recognized by this court in the case of Wilson v. 
W oo•druff, 65 Utah 118, but this court refused to apply 
it in that ·case because plaintiff had failed to establish 
by competent evidence that the accident occurred by rea-
son of a. defect in a part of the building reserved by the 
landlord. The fact is that such law ha.s no applicability 
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in the -case at bar for tJhe same reason it was not applied 
in the W-oodruff ease. Plaintiff failed to establish by 
any evidence whats~oever the 1cause of the accident or 
where the gas came from that exploded. Certainly, as 
stated by plaintiff on page 11 of her brief, it is beyond 
question that it was gas which e~ploded, but ·that does 
not establish the fact tihat the gas came from a pipe 
·beneath the building any more than it established that 
the gas .came from ·One of the appliances within or beneath 
the building. There were tw1o floor heaters beneath the 
building in question, one operated by plaintiff and iher 
husband and one operated by Wheelers. The evidence 
was uncontradicted that both of these appliances were 
under the control of the tenants. There were two gas 
ranges within the building, one of which was under the 
contr~ol of plaintiff and her husband and the other of 
which was under the control of the Wheelers. Certainly 
those appliances and the pipes and conne1ctions in con-
nection ·therewith were not under the control of defend-
ant Motor Park but were under the control of the tenants, 
and the defendant Motor Park was dependent entirely 
upon those tenants for information as to their condition. 
Until, therefore, plaintiff had first established by 
some competent evidence the cause of the explosion and 
the ·source of the gas which caused the explosion, the 
law contended for has no applicability. That such 
evidence might have to be more ·or less circumstantial 
and perhaps even dependent upon the opinion of an 
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expert does not do away with the necessity for its pro-
duction. 
Xor are the authorities listed in the three A. L. R. 
annotations cited by counsel for respondent to the con-
trary. A reading· of those cases shows that in each 
instance where the landlord has been held liable, the 
thing which caused the injury was identified and shown 
by competent evidence to have been under the landlord's 
control, regardless of its location upon the premises. 
In the case of Grobrecht v. Beckwith, (New Hamp.) 
52 A. L. R. 858, a gas water heater was in a bathroom 
over which the landlord retained control. 
The farthest that any court has ever gone in holding 
a landlord liable is the case of W ardman v. Hanlon, 
26 A. L. R. 1249, immediately preceding the notes cited 
by counsel for respondent. There the landlord had 
exclusive control over the pipes leading to the bathroom 
facilities in the apartment house. He had exclusive 
control over the hot water facilities within the apart-
ment house. The tenant had no control over those facil-
ities. There was not even a dispute upon those facts 
in that case. The landlord was held liable and the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur was held to apply because of 
the fact that the landlord had absolute control over those 
facilities. Certainly the same doctrine would not have 
applied had the hot water heater in question been within 
the apartment and operated by the tenant. The dis-
tinction is plainly evident. In the case at bar, on the 
other hand, the landlord had nothing to do with the 
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supply of gas into the premises and no control over it, 
had nothing to do with the operation of the appliances 
within and under the cottage, and plaintiff produced no 
evidence whatsoever as to the source of the gas which 
caused the explosion. 
With these distinguishing features in mind we join 
with respondent in inviting the court's attention to the 
cases annotated in thos-e three volumes of A. L. R. 
On page 12 of respondent's brief counsel quotes 
86 C. J., Section 899, page 217, to the effect that t:he land-
lord is liable for his failure to prevent the ·escape of gas 
fr·om pipes in such quantities as to be dangerous to a ten-
ant. Counsel fails to call the attention of the court, ho:w-
ever, to the fact that this statement is a sub-heading under 
Seetion '' B '' at page 212, under the main heading, 
''Where portions of property not demised or agencies and 
appliances are retained in contr·ol of the landlord" A ref-
erence to the eases cited to support that statement shows 
that in each instance it was a .cas·e where gas esicaped from 
an appliance wnder the control of the landlord. The 
quotation given by counsel for respondent standing alone 
would be ridiculous in the extreme unless applied within 
the limitations of the general rule stated above. A land-
lord certainly is no guarantor that ga:s will not escape 
from pipes where the appliances, facilities and even 
the pipes are within premises demised to the tenant. 
The landloro is entirly dependent upon the tenant under 
those circumstances, and the authorities which we have 
submitted hold that the landlord cannot be liable under 
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those conditions. This quotation is art apt illustration 
of how a quotation of that kind may be· misunderstood 
and misapplied when dis..asociated from its place in 
the legal picture, and yet how perfectly correct when 
roupled with the subject matter to which it is related. 
Counsel has gone t·o great lengths in quoting from 
the evidence of illr. Lindholm, William Dawson, Harvey 
B. Bussell, Rosa Louise Bussell, Clara Tissot and John 
Swager to show that there were gas odors on occasions 
in the Mot·or Park. From this evidence he draws the 
conclusion that the pipes and connections at the Motor 
Park were in bad condition and that on two specific 
occasions during the twenty days immediately before 
the explosion the Motor Park failed to take action to 
remedy a condition in the immediate vicinity of the 
Loos cottage. 
As heretofore stated, the defendant Motor Park 
did not deny that there were gas odors in and about 
the cottages. It adiDitted that there were o-ccasions when 
odors were frequent. There were 113 cottages equipped 
with gas burners and heating appliances. There were 
occasions when, from natural wear and tear, a connection 
would become loose. Also through operation of appli-
ances by tenants pilot lights would become extinguished 
tand there would be an odor of gas. As testified by Mr. 
Lindholm any place where ga.s is used there is bound 
to :be an occasional odor. It is very ·offensive and a. little 
of it goes a long way. However, gas is nothing to be 
trifled with and the Motor Park always called the' gas 
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company whenever they were notified ·of a leak of any 
kind. 
William Dawson testified. that while he observed the 
odor of gas in his own apartment tha.t. it was fued and 
he never complained to the Motor Park management 
thereafter. 
Clara Tissot complained of the ·odor of gas in her 
apartment and it was fixed. She made no complaint to 
the management thereafter. 
John Swager observed the odor of gas in his cabin 
but not outside. He never reported it to the ·officers 
of the Motor Park; didn't know whether the odor came 
from the appliances. 
Mr. and Mrs. Bussell observed an odor of gas in 
the driveway between their cottage and the Wheeler 
cottage most ·Of the time between the second or third 
of January and the tin1e of the explosion. She claimed 
to have reported it to Mr. Sheets on or about the 
second or third of January, at which time (Ab. 38-39) 
a boy was sent to look at it and she did not know what 
the officials of the l\1otor Park did about it. She also 
claimed to have reported it again on or about the 17th 
of January. Mrs. I vie Graham Adams testified that 
on this occasion (the Sunday before the explosion) the 
pilot light in the floor furnace had become extinguished 
and was emitting an odor of gas. She testified that she 
lighted the pilot light. 
From this evidence counsel seeks to establish that 
the defendant Motor Park failed to inspect the pipes 
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and connections, that the pipes and connection were in 
need of repair, and that the complaints by tenants were 
not followed by prompt attention on these two specific 
occasions during twenty days immediately before the 
explosion. 
~Irs. Bussell claimed to have made these complaints 
to ~lr. Sheets. "\Yhile ~lr. Sheets denied these conversa-
tions with ~Irs. Bussell, and while Mrs. Bussell admitted 
on cross-examination that she had a financial interest 
in making these statements when they were first made 
bY" her, we must nevertheless for the purpose of this 
appeal accept them as true. Regardles-s of whether she 
made any complaint to Mr. Sheets or not it was estab-
lished by her own evidence that as to the first incident 
action was taken by the Motor Park to investigate the 
situation, and in the second instance the cause of the 
gas odor was definitely established and shown to have 
been eliminated. Mr. Sheets testified (Ah. 56) that he 
was near the Bussell and Wheeler cabins three or four 
times a day, and Mrs. Adams, the housekeeper, was in 
and about the Loos and Wheeler cottages on the very 
day ·of the accident. There were other employees of the 
Jlotor Park at the premi·ses. The cottages in question 
are about 125 or 1'50 feet from tJhe office (Ab. 64). Mrs. 
Bussell and her husband, Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler and Mr. 
and Mrs. Loos had ample opportunity to make com-
plaint, and if one or even two complaints were not 
sufficient to again complain, if there was a dangerous 
condition in or about their premises. Mr. and Mrs. Loos 
of course testified that there was no odor of gas in or 
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about their .cottage, and the Wheelers were not called to 
testify at all. 
This .court will certainly take judicial notice of the 
fact that gas is a highly inflammable substance. If there 
was any leak in the pipe or connections beneath any of 
these cottages prior to the time of the explosion, why 
did the explosion not occur or some fire happen on or 
between the second day of January and the 17th day 
of January, when Mrs. Bussell claims to have observed 
these odors of gas, and when she says they were par-
ticularly strong~ This accident occurred during the 
winter-time. There were two floor furnaces and two 
ranges in operation in the Loos-Wheeler cottage. If 
gas was permeating these structures either within or 
beneath them that gas would have ignited when the leak 
first occurred. Even an appellate court may disregard 
evidence shown to be improbable ·or· impossible in the 
presence of established physical facts. 
Certain it is that if there was a gas odor in the 
garage between the Wheeler and Bussell cottages be-
tween the second of January and the 17th of January, 
that gas did not come from the same souree as the gas 
which caused the explosion. Mrs. Loos testified that 
there was no odor of gas in her cottage just before the 
explosion when she went into the !bathroom. When she 
came out there wa.s a ·strong odor of gas a.nd an im-
mediate explosion. This leads to only one conclusion, 
namely, that the gas which ·caused the explosion was 
emitted in great quantities ~at tJhe particular moment 
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from some unidentified source-either a sudden break 
or a turning on ·of an appliance. The gas so emitted 
ignited and exploded immediately because it -came in 
.such quantities that it could find no escape ~nd because 
it e.ame immediately into contact with one or more of the 
four pilot lights or a lighted appliance in the cottage. 
Whether the explosion occurred beneath the floor, or 
whether it was in the tCottage and also beneath the floor 
is not shown. 
While the s·ource of the gas which exploded was not 
established by ·a~ny evidence, it was definitely shown that 
the only possible souree·S of ignition were pilot lights 
in the appliances or a lighted applianc;e within the cot-
tages. The gas had to travel to the lights to become 
ignited, and the first ignition had to be within the cot-
tages themselves. This does not establish any particular 
sourc-e of the gas which caused the explosion. 
In connection with this evidence as to the presence 
of gas odors on previous occasions and at other pla1ces 
within the Park, we respectfully call the court's atten-
tion to the case of Mowers v. Municipal Gas Company 
of Albany, 126 N. Y. 8. 1033. ·This wa.s an action against 
a Gas ~Company for personal injury. Prior to the explo-
sion plaintiff had smelled a strong odor of gas in his 
apartment. Shortly thereafter an explosion occurred, 
wrecking the room and injuring the plaintiff. It was 
subsequently discovered that there was a break in the 
gas main in the ·street and that ga·s had forced itself 
alono- the main ·and along the service pipe into th!e 
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apartment. Plaintiff sought to hold the gas company 
liable upon the theory that its main in the street was 
old, deteriorated, and that a break might reasonably 
be expected, and that in fact the 1break had existed for 
many months, the odor of gas being perc.eptible at 
various times and more violent on parti,cular o·ccasions. 
Plaintiff established by evidence that there were various 
complaints to the gas company of the smell of gas by 
the occupants ·of houses in the vicinity. Repairmen were 
sent and the leak in most cases discovered, and after 
repair·s were m1ade the smells ceased. The evidence of 
gas odors a:t various places was even strong~r than was 
attempted to be produced by plaintiff in the case at bar. 
A judgment for the plaintiff Wlas reversed upon the 
ground that such evidenc~ did not establish the fact that 
those vari-ous and miscellaneous gas odors came from 
the souDce which caused the explosion and that the evi-
dence had flailed to establish that the break which did 
occur and from which the gas actually came was known 
to defendant a sufficient length of time in advance to 
have permitted repair. It seems to us that this Clase is 
upon all fours with the case at bar. 
We also refer to the case of H'ammerschm.idt v. 
Municipal Gas Company, 99 N. Y. S. 890, upon the ·same 
subject matter. 
This court has held in numerous ca·s·es that the fact 
that a defendant may have been negligent in other mat-
ters or on other occasions does not justify a verdict. 
The specific negligence alleged must be proved. 
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condition of disrepair or deterioration in the condition 
of the pipes. The most that can be said for such evi-
dence is that it had a bearing upon an is·sue whicih was 
alleged and presented as against the defendant gas 
company only. It was alleged in the ~complaint that the 
defendants continued to furnish gas after a condition 
of disrepair or deterioration was known or should have 
been known. That allegation in turn has to be read in 
connection ''ith the further allegations of the complaint 
that the gas company was furnishing the gas. Nowhere 
is it alleged in the complaint that the Motor Park was 
furnishing the gas, but on the other hand it is expressly 
alleged that the gas was furnished by the gas company. 
Such evidence -could not therefore, in the presence of 
those allegations, be the basis of liability on the part of 
the Motor Park which was furnishing no gas and which 
was not even alleged to be furnishing ga·s. 
If such allegation and ·evidence could be made the 
basis of a finding of negligence upon the part of the 
Motor Park, then we respectfully submit that under the 
uncontradicted evidence the M·otor Park did all that it 
. could do under the circumstances, namely, rcall the gas 
company again and .again and as often as leaks were 
reported to it. Certainly that was the natural source of 
as·sistance for the Motor Park in such cases, and if there 
W!as anything wrong the Motor Park was unaware ·of it. 
If appliance leaks from natural wear and tear in an 
establishment of this kind can be made the basis of 
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liability a~ainst a landlord, then we respectfully submit 
that the owner of an apartment house, hotel, or othe-r 
establishment where gas i·s used becom.es a guarantor 
and can be held liable, re~ardless ·of the suddenness or 
unexpectedness of an event, by merely calling the various 
tenants to testify that they smelled gas on several 
ocea,sions. Such is not the law. An ample answer to 
that contention is found in the authorities which we have 
cited. 
The difference between these wear and tear leaks 
such as was described by the various witnesses who were 
called to testify and the major emission of gas such as 
caused the explosion in question in this case was reco:g-
niz·ed by the Wis{~onsin Supreme Court in the case of 
Morrison v. Superior Water, Lig'ht <ffi Power Company, 
114 N. W. 434, wherein the court denied liability upon 
the basis of that character of evidence in attempting t·o 
establish liability for an explosion, the Wisconsin .court 
.stating that in the best of systems such leaks are bound 
to occur and are not of themselves evidence of negligence. 
We respectfully submit, therefore, that there is 
nothing in the facts of this case, ·or in the law, to whi0h 
counsel for respondent has directed attention which in 
any way affect the applicability of authorities cited 
by us under this point in our former brief, and we urge 
on the basis of those authorities and the additional cases 
cited herein that the trial ·court erred in refusing to 
grant the motion for non-suit and directed verdict. 
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But, says counsel for respondent, even though re-
spondent might have failed to estalblish the cause of the 
explosion, nevertheless the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
is applicable and establishes negligence. 
II. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAD NO 
APPLICABILITY AS AGAINST DEFENDANT MOTOR PARK? 
Respondent seems to have been unable to find any 
case holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies 
under the uncontradicted :Baets ·of this case. 
Assuming, as stated by respondent, that the doctrine 
may apply even though partircular acts of negligence 
be alleged, this does not make the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur applicable in cases where it does not apply. 
As is stated in the authorities cited by us, before 
the doctrine can ever be applied the cause of the ex-
plosion (the source of the ga.s) must be definitely estab-
lished. In the absence of such evidence how can the 
doctrine ever be applied~ 
See Hubbert v. Aztec Brewing Company, (Oal.) 80 
Pac. ( 2d) 185 and 1016, wherein the California court 
refused to apply rthe doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a 
case where the cause of the explosion was unknown and 
WJhere the source of ignition was under the control of 
some agency other than the defendant. An excellent dis-
cussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and its ap-
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pli.cability in cases of this kind is set forrt:h in that case, 
both upon original decision and after granting petition 
for rehearing. 
The case of Wright v. Southern Counties Gas Com-
pavn.y, 283 Pac. 823, cited by respondent, is not in point, 
nor is the ·ease of Van Horn. v. Pac. R. &' R. Co., 148 
Pac. 951. In both of these cases the instrumentality 
causing t1he injury was shown to have been under the 
control o~ defendant and he sought to defend because 
others might have had access to it. That is not our 
case where two defendants are jointly charged, and the 
evidence shows the gas to have been under the control 
of the Gas Company and the appliances under the control 
of neither defendant. The \Vright and Van Horn deci-
sions were both by district courts ·of appeal of the State 
of California, not by the Supreme Court of the State 
of California. Subsequently these decisions wer·e con-
sidered and held inapplicable in the Hanneman and 
Gerdes cases from the District Courts ·of Appeal of 
California cited by us in our first brief, and the Supreme 
Court of the State of California, in reversing the Gerdes 
case upon other grounds, held that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur had no· applicaibility. 
The Supreme Court of the .State of Colorado in the 
case of Yellow Cab Company v. Hodson., 14 Pac. (2d) 
1081, ·Considered the Wright case but held that the doc-
trine there announced was inapplicable in a case where 
two persons are jointly charged with negligence. Ap-
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plicability of the doctrine destroys the possibility of two 
per~on~ being responsible for the injury. 
A~s.nmiug, vvithout admitting, that the pipes beneath 
the L'ottnges were under the control of the Motor Park, 
how can the doctrine of res ips~a loquitur apply in the 
a1bsence of some evidence that the pipes broke and gave 
off the gas that exploded"? 
The mere fact that Instruction No. 5 was requested 
as an alternate in the event the court refused to give 
instruction No. 2 has no bearing upon this question. 
That defendant accepted less than it was entitled to does 
not stop it from assigning error for failure of the court 
to give it all that it \Yas entitled to. It certainly needs 
no citation of authorities upon this subject. 
III. 
DID THE COURT IDRR IN REPEATEDLY ASSUMING AND STATING 
TO THE JURY IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE SYSTEM 
OF PIPES WITHIN THE MOTOR PARK WAS DEFECTIVE, 
LEAKING; AND THAT GAS WAS ESCAPING THEREFROM, 
AND THAT THE GAS WHICH CAUSED THE EXPLOSION 
AND INJURY TO PLAINTIFF CAME FROM DEFECTIVE OR 
LEAKING PIPES? 
The fact that these instructions were given at the 
request of the Gas Company instead of plaintiff does 
not make them any the less erroneous and prejudicial 
to defendant Motor Park. The trial court's attention 
was .ealled to this error but it was not corrected. The 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
fact that couns·el for respondent has read the instruc-
tions carefully and cannot find any such assumption, or 
any language from which such assumption can be in-
ferred, does not delete these statements and assumptions 
from the instructions. 
Respondent's entire brief is based upon the assump-
tion that the gas pipes beneath the Loos cottage had been 
leaking, and that the gas which exploded came from 
that s·ouree. H·e states on page ·21 in connection with 
his argument relating to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 
''In no other way may the verdict, under the instructions 
given, be explained", ref erring to this very assumption. 
This ·statement amply deri:wnstrates the magnitude of 
that particular issue in the case. If that was the para-
mount and maj.or issue, then it certainly was erroneous 
a.nd prejudicial for the court to have assumed those facts 
repeatedly in instructing the jury. 
Not only did counsel for respondent ha·se his entire 
case at the trial upon that assumption, but he has re-
peated the error in his brief on appeal, and the trial 
court grievously erred, to the prejudice of defendant, 
in ·making the same assumptions in its instructions. 
IV. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN HOLDING THE MOTOR PARK TO THE 
SAME DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY AS THE GAS COM-
pANY AS A SUPPLIER OF GAS? 
Respondent makes the following statement 1n dis-
cussing this point: 
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·'The :Jiotor Park n1ay have been a consumer, 
as between it and the Gas Company, and entitled 
to care commensurate with the inherent danger-
ous character of gas, but as to the plaintiff it 
is to be charged \Vi th the same degree of care.'' 
That is exaettly \d1ere counsel for respondent is in 
error. Two parties may be jointly chargeable with neg-
ligence. One may be held to a high degree of ,care a.s a 
dealer -or handler of a dangerous commodity. The other 
may be chargeable with negligence in failing 'to use 
ordinary care, or for technical violation of a.n ordinance 
or statute. It is the duty of the trial court in its instruc-
tions to the jury to state the degree of care required of 
each separately. In the Clase at bar the trial oourt er-
roneously threw the Motor Park (a customer or con-
sumer) into the category of a public utility or dealer in 
gas. 
The Motor Park was no more a. dealer or handler 
of a dangerous agency than the Wheelers, Loos, Bussells 
or any other customer. A landlord equips the premiseB 
for the supplying of gas by the gas company to its 
tenants, but the gas company sells the gas and the 
tenant operates it. A landlord may be chargeable for 
failure to correct a structural defect if it has an oppor-
tunity so to do, but this does not warrant an instruction 
making the landlord a seller or dealer. 
It was the duty of the trial court to segregate its 
instructions as to the two defendants because the defend-
ant Motor Park did not as a customer or consumer 
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occupy the .same position as the Gas Company, whose 
bus~ness it was to handle and deal with the agency which, 
under the uncontradieted evidence, causP.n the explosion. 
As was said in the case of S1awyer v. Sovuthern California 
Gas Company, 274 Pac. 544: 
''Gas companies as manufacturers and dis-
tributors of a highly explosive and inflammable 
substance, possess technical knowledge of the dan-
gers to be guarded against in handling or install-
ing gas appliances for illuminwting and commereial 
purposes fa,r beyond t1he knowledge possessed by 
the avera1f}e person." 
As to the re.maining assignments of error defendant 
M·otor Park submits them upon the brief heretofore 
presented. 
Respe.ctfully submitted, 
RICH, RiiCH & S:rRONG, 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Utah Motor Pa1rk, Inc. 
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